Inhalt

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   1 Introduction
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   1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
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   1.2 Research Questions
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   1.3 Thesis Organization and Contribution
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  1.4 Publications
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   1.4.1 Publications This Thesis Is Based On
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   1.4.2 Publications Not Related to This Thesis
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   1.5 A Note on Moral Implications of Network Monitoring
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   2 Fundamentals and Related Work
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  2.1 Improving the Network Throughput Performance of NIDS
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   2.1.1 Improving the Pattern Matching of NIDS
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   2.1.2 Reducing Network Traffic for Analysis
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   2.2 Flow Monitoring
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   2.2.1 Cisco NetFlow
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   2.2.2 Internet Protocol Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
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   2.3 Flow-Based Intrusion Detection
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   2.4 The Vermont Network Monitoring Toolkit
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   2.5 Intrusion Detection on Encrypted Traffic
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   3 Web 2.0 Security
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   3.1 Motivation
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   3.2 New Attacks of the Web 2.0
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   3.2.1 Merging of Security Domains Inside a Browser
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   3.2.2 Incomplete or Conflicting Standards
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   3.2.3 Unjustified Trust in the DNS and Public Key Infrastructures
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   3.3 Practical Mitigation Methods Today
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   3.3.1 Browser-Side Approaches
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   3.3.2 Server-Side Approaches
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   3.3.3 Solutions for Intermediate Devices
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   3.3.4 Attack Coverage
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   3.4 Open Research Challenges
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   3.4.1 Browsers Protection Against Typical Web 2.0 Attacks
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   3.4.2 Protection in Intermediate Devices
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   3.4.3 Secure and Easy to Use Application Frameworks for the Server-Side
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   3.4.4 Rethinking the Interaction Between Browser, Server and Components
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   3.5 Lessons Learned
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   4 Combining Anomaly Detectors Using Controlled Skips
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   4.1 Motivation
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  4.2 Architecture
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   4.2.1 Packet Analysis
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   4.2.2 Controlled Load Allocation Scheme
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   4.2.3 Post-Processing of Packets
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   4.3 Evaluation
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   4.3.1 Anomaly Detection Algorithms
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   4.3.2 Controlled Load Allocation Scheme
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   4.3.3 Behavior under Stress
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   4.4 Lessons Learned
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   5 Preprocessing HTTP for Network Monitoring and Intrusion Detection
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   5.1 Motivation
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   5.2 Importance of HTTP-Related Threats
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  5.3 Aggregating HTTP into IPFIX
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   5.3.1 Related Work In HTTP Monitoring and Aggregation
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   5.3.2 HTTP Aggregation Architecture
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   5.3.3 TCP Reassembly Engine
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   5.3.4 HTTP Parser
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   5.3.5 HTTP Aggregation Evaluation
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  5.4 HPA: HTTP-Based Payload Aggregation
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   5.4.1 HPA Concept
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   5.4.2 HPA Implementation
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   5.4.3 HPA Evaluation
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   5.5 Lessons Learned
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   6 FIXIDS: A Signature-Based Flow Intrusion Detection System
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   6.1 Motivation
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  6.2 FIXIDS
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   6.2.1 Rules and Signatures
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   6.2.2 Implementation
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  6.3 Evaluation Experiment Setup
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   6.3.1 Snort
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   6.3.2 FIXIDS Setup
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   6.3.3 Vermont Flow Probe
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   6.3.4 nProbe Flow Probe
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   6.3.5 Network Setup
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   6.3.6 Used Detection Rules
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   6.3.7 Attack Network Traffic
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   6.3.8 Realistic Network Traffic
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   6.4 Functional Evaluation
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  6.5 Throughput Performance Evaluation
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   6.5.1 Basic Throughput Experiments
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   6.5.2 Third-Party Flow Exporter Experiments
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   6.5.3 Real World Scenario
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   6.6 Lessons Learned
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   7 GENESIDS: An Automated System for Generating Attack Traffic
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   7.1 Motivation
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   7.2 Related Work in Traffic Generation
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  7.3 GENESIDS Architecture
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   7.3.1 Input and Connection Management
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   7.3.2 Rules
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   7.3.3 Limitations
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   7.3.4 Generating Mixed Traffic
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   7.4 Evaluation
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   7.5 Lessons Learned
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   8 Conclusion
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   Bibliography